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This paper studies unshrouding decisions in a framework similar
to Gabaix and Laibson (2006), but considers an alternative unshroud-
ing mechanism where the impact of advertising add-on information de-
pends on the number of unshrouding firms. We show that shrouding be-
comes less prevalent as the number of competing firms increases. With
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1 Introduction
For the functioning of markets, information and transparency on the con-
sumer side are essential. The degree of consumer information can be heavily
influenced by firm strategy, often to the detriment of consumers. One popular
business strategy in this respect is to hide information over add-ons with the
aim to charge unaware consumers overpriced fees. Prominent examples for
this strategy, for instance, include the pricing of printer and corresponding
cartridges or the pricing of current accounts and overdraft fees as add-on.1, 2
In a recent paper, Gabaix and Laibson (2006), henceforth GL, analyze firms’
incentives to shroud such add-on information in a competitive environment.
They show that if the number of myopic consumers, who do not foresee high
add-on prices or underestimate add-on consumption, are sufficiently high,
an equilibrium with high add-on fees and shrouding of add-on information
exists. Base good prices, however, are low as firms want to attract many con-
sumers who buy the overpriced add-on. In this equilibrium, consumers who
are aware of this pricing strategy (sophisticated consumers in the terminol-
ogy of GL) substitute away from add-on consumption. In GL, the existence of
such a shrouding equilibrium is independent of the number of firms compet-
ing in a market, leading to the conclusion that intensifying competition does
not improve information on the consumer side.
In GL, unshrouding of add-on information has two effects. Firstly, sophis-
ticated consumers can now observe the add-on price. Secondly, if at least
one firm decides to unshroud a fraction of myopic consumers is educated and
becomes aware of the add-on. In this paper, we propose an alternative un-
shrouding mechanism where the number of myopic consumers who become
educated by unshrouding increases with the number of unshrouding firms.
The reason for this modification is that it is more likely that a myopic con-
sumer picks up that information and becomes aware of the add-on if more
firms send out advertising messages.
1In practice, consumers might often be informed about the (high) prices of printer car-
tridges, but might underestimate their importance and, hence, underestimate the total costs
of buying a certain printer. In this context, an unshrouding strategy by a firm might include
the disclosure of the total cost of printing, for example, by providing typical consumer exam-
ples.
2See Armstrong and Vickers (2012) for a discussion of such strategies in the retail banking
industry.
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We characterize the equilibrium of the shrouding game and provide two ar-
guments why in markets with many competitors shrouding of information
may be less prevalent. Firstly, unshrouding equilibria exist for a wider range
of parameter values if the number of competing firms increases. The reason
is that, in our setup, a strategic complementarity in unshrouding incentives
arises (Bulow et al., 1985). The more firms unshroud add-on information, the
larger are the incentives for other firms to unshroud as well as less myopic
consumers, who can be fooled by high add-on prices, remain in the market.
This result is in contrast to GL. Secondly, as in GL, under a wide range of
parameters multiple equilibria exist (all firms shrouding and all firms un-
shrouding). Thus, equilibrium selection is an issue. As the number of firms
increases, unshrouding equilibria become more favorable in terms of risk con-
siderations making it more likely that firms coordinate on the unshrouding
equilibrium. In particular, we show that the parameter range, where the
unshrouding equilibrium is picked according according to risk dominance
(Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) and to global games (Carlsson and van Damme,
1993), becomes larger as competition intensifies. Given these two reasons,
this paper therefore argues that shrouding of add-on information may be less
likely to be observed in competitive markets, and fostering market entry may
be an effective tool to raise market transparency and consumer information.
The paper is also related to recent work by Heidhues et al. (2012) who ana-
lyze a model with perfect substitutes where firms may shroud one price com-
ponent (instead of an add-on). The authors demonstrate that shrouding does
only take place in concentrated markets. However, with positive unshrouding
costs an unshrouding equilibrium ceases to exist. We also show that intensi-
fied competition decreases incentives to shroud, however, in contrast, in our
framework an unshrouding equilibrium can also exist in the presence of un-
shrouding costs.
More generally, the paper is related to the literature that analyzes competi-
tion in the presence of behaviorally biased consumers and on firm strategy
how to exploit such imperfect behavior.3 For instance, Spiegler (2006) consid-
ers a model where complicated products have multiple price elements which
all need to be evaluated to infer a product’s total price, but consumers only
3A survey on the impact of competition in markets where consumers exhibit behavioral
biases is provided by Huck and Zhou (2011) and a textbook treatment is provided by Spiegler
(2011).
3
base their purchase decision on one single element. Piccione and Spiegler
(2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013) develop models where consumer can
be confused by different price frames. Carlin (2009) and Gu and Wenzel
(2013) study firm’s incentives to use obfuscation strategies to impede con-
sumers’ ability to compare different offers.
2 The model
The model is based on Gabaix and Laibson (2006), but differs in the effect of
unshrouding. In contrast to GL, the share of myopic consumers who becomes
educated due to unshrouding depends on the number of unshrouding firms.
We consider an oligopoly market where n Ê 2 firms offer a base good and an
add-on. Each consumer demands at most one unit of the base good and one
unit of the add-on where the add-on can only be purchased from the firm
where the base good has been bought. All firms produce the base good and
the add-on at no costs.
Base good prices, pi, are observable by all consumers. Add-on prices, pˆi, how-
ever, can only be observed if firms advertise them. There are two types of con-
sumers: myopic and sophisticated consumers. Sophisticated consumers are
aware of the add-on and form beliefs about add-on prices if they are shrouded.
Myopic consumers are completely unaware of the add-on and, hence, base
their purchase decision solely on base-good prices.4 Initially, the share of
myopic (sophisticated) consumers is α (1−α), where α ∈ (0,1).
Firms can unshroud add-on information, that is, advertise their add-on fees.
Unshrouding has two consequences. Firstly, if a firm decides to unshroud, so-
phisticated consumers learn the add-on price charged by this firm. Secondly,
by unshrouding some myopic consumers become aware of the add-on and be-
have like sophisticated consumers. In contrast to GL, we assume that the
fraction of consumers that becomes sophisticated depends on the number of
unshrouding firms. Define µ(k) as the share of myopic consumers who remain
myopic if k firms decide to unshroud. We assume that µ(k) is a decreasing
4Kosfeld and Schüwer (2011) analyze a variant of GL where firms can (imperfectly) dis-
criminate between sophisticated and myopic consumer.
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function of the number of unshrouding firms,
∂µ(k)
∂k
< 0. Conversely, if k firms
unshroud, a fraction (1−µ(k)) of myopic consumers becomes sophisticated.
There are several reasons why a larger number of unshrouding firms in-
creases the number of sophisticated consumers. Firstly, if unshrouding firms
send out advertising messages randomly to consumers it is more likely that a
consumer receives an advertising message if more firms advertise. Secondly
and alternatively, suppose that not all myopic consumers pay attention to
add-on prices even if they receive disclosure information. For instance, this
could be because some consumers do not understand that they will want to
buy the add-on in the future. However, if consumers receive multiple warn-
ings and repeatedly receive information on high add-on fees there might be
a larger likelihood that they pick up this information eventually and behave
accordingly. With both interpretations, we would argue that the number of
consumers becoming informed increases in the number of unshrouding firms.
In Section 4 we provide a simple microfoundation based on advertising that
derives a function µ(k).
Firms can charge a maximal price of p for the add-on. Sophisticated con-
sumers can avoid buying the add-on by turning to an outside substitution
at a cost e. As in GL, sophisticated consumers decide whether to avoid the
add-on at the same stage where they decide on the base-good purchase.
To model competition in the base-good market we follow GL. Define xi as the
anticipated net surplus of buying the base good from firm i relative to the
net surplus from buying the next best alternative. As we solve for symmet-
ric equilibria, the next best alternative is the symmetric equilibrium price
charged by all other firms. Equilibrium prices are denoted by an asterisk.
The anticipated net surplus for sophisticated consumers equals
xi = [p∗+min(e,Epˆ∗)]− [pi+min(e,Epˆi)], (1)
where Epˆi and Epˆ
∗ are the expected add-on prices.
For myopic consumers, ignoring add-on purchases, the anticipated net sur-
plus is
xi = p∗− pi. (2)
The probability that a consumer chooses to buy the base good from firm i
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is denoted by D(xi) which depends on the anticipated net surplus from this
alternative. This demand function strictly increases with xi and is bounded
between zero and one.5
We study the following three-stage game:
• In stage 1, firms set prices for the base good, pi, as well as for the
add-on pˆi. In addition, each firm decides whether to unshroud add-on
information.
• In stage 2, consumers decide from which firm to buy the base good.
Sophisticated consumers (and myopic consumers who have become so-
phisticated) can also decide whether to substitute away from the add-
on.
• In stage 3, myopic consumers buy the add-on. Sophisticated consumers
buy the add-on only if they have not substituted away at stage 2.
3 Results
This section provides the equilibrium of the game. The following Proposition
states equilibrium shrouding decisions:
Proposition 1. Let α= e
p
and α= e
pµ(n−1) , where α<α.
i) If α≥α , there exists a shrouding equilibrium where all firms shroud add-
on information. Firms choose an add-on price pˆ∗ = p and all sophisticated
consumers substitute away from add-on consumption.
ii) If α≤α, there exists an unshrouding equilibrium where all firms unshroud
add-on information. Firms choose an add-on price pˆ∗ = e and all sophisticated
consumers decide to purchase the add-on.
Proof: see the Appendix.
5Formally, such a demand function can be derived by a random-utility model (e.g., Anderson
et al., 1992).
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The firms’ shrouding decisions depend on the number of myopic consumers
in the market. A shrouding equilibrium exists if the share of myopic con-
sumers is larger than some critical number, α. Conversely, an unshroud-
ing equilibrium exists if the number of myopic consumers is sufficiently low,
α ≤ α = e
pµ(n−1) . Note that, as in GL, for some parameters ranges, multiple
equilibria exist. For α ∈ [α,α], both a shrouding and an unshrouding equi-
librium exist. Shrouding is the unique symmetric equilibrium if α > α, and
unshrouding is the unique symmetric equilibrium if α<α.
In GL, the conditions for a shrouding or an unshrouding equilibrium to exist,
are independent of the number of competitors (n). That is, according to GL,
whether or not we should observe shrouding of add-on information is inde-
pendent of the competitive pressure in an industry. This can best be seen by
noting that in GL µ(k)= µ is a constant and does not depend on the number
of unshrouding firms.6 This is in contrast to our model.
In the following, we will argue that, in our setup, shrouding becomes less
prevalent if competition becomes more intense. We provide two arguments
for this claim. First, we will show that as the number of firms increases
the parameter range for which an unshrouding equilibrium exists increases.
Secondly, we show that the unshrouding equilibrium becomes more favorable
in terms of risk consideration with a larger number of firms. This is relevant
as the range where multiple equilibria exist becomes larger with more firms.
An unshrouding equilibrium exists if α < α = e
pµ(n−1) . It can be easily seen
that this parameter range increases with the number of firms in the market:
∂α
∂n
=− e
p[µ(n−1)]2
∂µ
∂n
> 0. (3)
Proposition 2. As the number of firms increases, the parameter range, for
which an unshrouding equilibrium exists, increases.
Proposition 2 shows that the existence of an unshrouding equilibrium de-
pends on the intensity of competition. The reason for this result is a strategic
complementarity (in the sense of Bulow et al. (1985)) in unshrouding incen-
6In GL, the corresponding cut-off values are α = e
p
and α = e
pµ
. Both values are indepen-
dent of the number of firms, n.
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tives. For given (base good and add-on) prices, each unshrouding firm reduces
the number of myopic consumers and, hence, increases the incentives to un-
shroud for other firms as well. This is simply because the number of myopic
consumers who would buy the expensive (shrouded) add-on becomes smaller
with more unshrouding competitors. In consequence, unshrouding is more
likely to be an equilibrium if the number of competitors is large, even if the
initial number of myopic consumers is high.
In Heidhues et al. (2012) a larger number of firms also makes unshroud-
ing more likely. The mechanism underlying their result differs however. In
their model with a potentially shrouded price component, an unshrouding
firm can attract additional consumers from competitors by adopting a trans-
parent price strategy, and such a strategy is only worthwhile if competition
is sufficiently intense.
Note, however, that as the number of firms increases, the parameter range
with multiple equilibria also becomes larger, that is, the interval [α,α] be-
comes larger.7 Hence, equilibrium selection is an issue. In our case, for any
given base good price, unshrouding is a relatively safe strategy yielding a
safe payoff of e for every attracted customer. There is risk associated with
the shrouding strategy. The payoff for selling the add-on decreases in the
number of unshrouding firms. If few firms unshroud a high payoff from add-
on sales can be expected, however, the payoff is low if many firms decide to
unshroud as the number of myopic consumers would be small in that case.
To select among equilibria, we use the notion of risk dominance by Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) and the selection criterion based on a global games ap-
proach offered by Carlsson and van Damme (1993). Both criteria take risk
considerations into account and deliver similar results.8 A good argument for
selecting equilibria in terms of risk is also given in laboratory experiments.
Among others, van Huyck et al. (1990) and Schmidt et al. (2003) show that
in coordination games risk dominated equilibria are more likely to be chosen
by actual players.
We find:
7As shown above the upper bound increases with n and the lower bound is independent of
n.
8In the case of two players, both criteria coincide, but deviate for a larger number of players.
However, qualitatively similar results arise when applying either of these criteria (Kim, 1996).
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Proposition 3. As the number of firms increases, the parameter range, where
the unshrouding equilibrium is the selected equilibrium according to risk-
dominance and according to global games, increases.
Proof: see the Appendix.
Propositions 2 and 3 provide two arguments why unshrouding of add-on in-
formation becomes more prevalent as the intensity of competition increases:
Unshrouding becomes an equilibrium for a larger parameter range and, in
case of multiple equilibria, the unshrouding equillibrium becomes more fa-
vorable in terms of risk. This is intuitively appealing as, with many firms,
it is more likely that at least some firms unshroud making it more risky to
shroud the add-on. In consequence, the riskless unshrouding option becomes
more attractive. The policy implication we can draw from this is that fos-
tering entry of more firms can have, besides the positive competitive effect
on base good competition,9 the beneficial effect of promoting market trans-
parency by increasing firms’ incentives to educate consumers.
4 Example
The analysis so far has only assumed that µ(k) is decreasing in the number
of unshrouding firms. This section considers a simple microfoundation based
on advertising that derives such a function.
Example 1
Suppose that each unshrouding firm sends out an advertising message which
is received and understood by a myopic consumer with probability λ ∈ (0,1).10
Assuming that messages are independent from each other, then if k firms
decide to unshroud and send out an advertising message, a fraction (1−λ)k of
myopic consumers do not pick up that information and remains myopic while
a fraction 1− (1−λ)k receives and understands the disclosure information.
Then, µ(k)= (1−λ)k and ∂µ(k)
∂k
= (1−λ)k ln(1−λ)< 0.
9See GL, for a discussion on this issue.
10For costly advertising we refer to the discussion in Section 5.
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As
∂µ(k)
∂k
< 0 our results from Propositions 2 and 3 immediately apply and, as
the number of firms is increased, the parameter range with an unshrouding
equilibrium increases. Interestingly, in this example, it can also be shown
that, if the number of firms becomes sufficiently large, α eventually becomes
larger than one, and unshrouding is an equilibrium for all α ∈ (0,1]. This
critical number of competing firms can be calculated explicitly:
n> 1+
ln
[
e
p
]
ln[1−λ] . (4)
Hence, if competition is sufficiently intense, unshrouding is always an equi-
librium, independent of the initial level of consumer myopia (as measured by
α).
Example 2
In example 1, it is assumed that the probability that a myopic consumer re-
ceives any given advertising message is independent of the number of firms in
the market. As a consequence, if all firms in the market decide to unshroud,
the number of consumers who become aware of add-ons is higher in larger
markets. In this section, we consider an example where the probability that
a consumer receives a given advertising message depends on the number of
firms. In other words, the impact of advertising is related to a firm’s market
share.
Suppose that a myopic consumer receives an advertising message with a
probability of 1− (1−λ) 1n . Hence, in large markets (high n) a given adver-
tising message has a smaller effect. Then, the share of myopic consumers
who do not receive any message if k firms choose to advertise add-on infor-
mation is µ(k)= (1−λ)
(
k
n
)
.11 As
∂µ(k)
∂k
= 1
n
(1−λ) kn ln(1−λ)< 0, the results from
Propositions 2 and 3 apply.
11Note that, with this formulation, if all firms decide to unshroud the number of consumers
who become aware of add-ons is independent of the number of competing firms. That is,
µ(k= n)= (1−λ).
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5 Costly unshrouding
So far, unshrouding add-on information has been costless. Now suppose there
is a (fixed) cost c > 0 associated with unshrouding. In general, incentives to
unshroud will be lower with unshrouding costs.
Notice first that, with perfect competition (base products and add-ons are
homogenous products), unshrouding equilibria cannot exist because the av-
erage profit level per consumer is competed down toward marginal cost (zero,
in our case) and firms would earn negative profits if unshrouding would take
place. This is the case analyzed in Heidhues et al. (2012). However, if firms
have market power, unshrouding equilibria may still exist, though under
more restrictive conditions than in the base case.
As the incentives to shroud/unshroud are difficult to analyze with general
demand functions we now use the circular city approach to model differenti-
ated base goods where the degree of product differentiation / market power is
denoted by the transport cost parameter t (Salop, 1979).12 An unshrouding
equilibrium exists under the following conditions:
Proposition 4. Define αˆ= ne+2
p
t(t−cn2)−2t
np¯µ(n−1) . Then, a symmetric unshrouding
equilibrium exists if
i) α≤ αˆ,
ii) t
n2
≥ c.
Proof: see the Appendix.
The first condition states that for an unshrouding equilibrium to exist, the
share of myopic consumers must not be too large. The second condition states
unshrouding costs must not be too high to ensure non-negative profits in an
unshrouding equilibrium. Note that, for c = 0, condition i) simplifies to αˆ =
e
p¯µ(n−1) =α, the condition from the base model without unshrouding costs (see
Proposition 1). Condition 2 is always fulfilled with c= 0.
12Qualitatively similar results are obtained in the case of a random-utility model as in An-
derson et al. (1992), however the analysis is less tractable.
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unshrouding
equilibrium exists
(a) low unshrouding costs
unshrouding
equilibrium exists
(b) high unshrouding cost
Figure 1: Existence of unshrouding equilibrium
We now analyze the impact of the number of firms on the existence of an
unshrouding equilibrium. Suppose unshrouding costs are not too high such
that condition ii) is met. Then, increasing the number of firms has two effects.
First, as in the base model without unshrouding costs, shrouding becomes a
less attractive option if many other firms have unshrouded so that the num-
ber of remaining myopic consumers is small. This is because µ(k) decreases
with k. Second, as with positive c > 0, unshrouding profits become rather
low if there are many firms and the incentives to deviate from unshrouding
to avoid paying c rises with the number of firms. This can be seen by not-
ing that ∂αˆ
∂n
|µ=const.< 0. The overall impact of the number of firms depends
on the strength of those two effects and, in particular, on the level of the
unshrouding cost. We illustrate this by using µ(k) = (1−λ)k from example
1 and using parameter values p¯ = 1, e = 0.5,λ = 0.3, t = 1 and two levels of
unshrouding costs: low unshrouding cost (c = 0.025) and high unshrouding
cost (c = 0.05).13 The results are displayed in Figure 1. The left panel shows
that, with low unshrouding costs, the result from the base model is confirmed.
The existence of an unshrouding equilibrium is more likely with more firms.
With high unshrouding costs, the impact of competition is non-monotonic: If
the number of firms is increased in a concentrated market the scope for an
unshrouding equilibrium rises while increasing the number of firms in an al-
ready unconcentrated market leads to a smaller parameter range for which
an unshrouding equilibrium exists.
To sum up, the incentives to unshroud are lower with unshrouding costs.
13We find qualitatively similar results for other parameter values.
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However, unshrouding equilibria still exist and the impact of more intense
competition can be positive provided that unshrouding costs are not too high.
For high levels of unshrouding cost we observe a non-monotonic relationship
where unshrouding is likely for an intermediate market concentration, but
less prevalent for very competitive and very concentrated markets.
6 Conclusion
This paper has revisited shrouding of add-on information in the framework
of Gabaix and Laibson (2006), but has modified the unshrouding mechanism.
The main conclusion of the paper is that more intense competition may shift
industry behavior toward unshrouding. We have provided two arguments
in favor of this. Firstly, unshrouding becomes an equilibrium for a larger
parameter range. Secondly, in the parameter range where multiple equilib-
ria exist, unshrouding becomes more favorable in terms of risk. From this
we conclude that fostering market entry may be an effective tool to increase
market performance, even in situations where initial consumer information
is poor.
Introducing unshrouding costs qualifies our results somewhat. For small
level of unshrouding costs, unshrouding still becomes more prevalent if the
number of firms is increased. However, for higher unshrouding costs a non-
montonic relationship between the number of firms and unshrouding may be
observed.
A Appendix
Derivation of Proposition 1
The proof follows the one in Gabaix and Laibson (2006). The existence of symmetric
equilibrium base-good prices is ensured by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991).
Consumers form the following beliefs: If a firm shrouds, sophisticated consumers
rationally anticipate high add-on prices (p¯) to arise which is the profit-maximizing
13
add-on price. Hence, a consumer chooses the outside option at cost e. If a firm un-
shrouds, a sophiciated consumer can observe the chosen add-on price. Myopic con-
sumers do not form beliefs about add-on prices. Given these beliefs it is optimal for
a firm to charge an add-on price of p¯ if it shrouds and choose price e if it unshrouds.
We now determine equilibrium shrouding decisions. Define α= e
p
and α= e
pµ(n−1) .
i) Suppose that α≥α. We show that all firms shrouding add-on prices is an equilib-
rium.
Suppose that all firms except firm i shroud the add-on and set an add-on price pˆ= p.
If firm i also decides to shroud, it optimally sets an add-on price pˆi = p, leading to
profits of
Πs = (1−α)D(−pi− e+ p∗+ e)[pi]+αD(−pi+ p∗)[pi+ p] (5)
= D(−pi+ p∗)[pi+αp].
The first term are profits from sophisticated consumers who only demand the base
good and avoid paying for the add-on by incurring costly effort. Hence, firm i earns
an amount pi for each sophisticated consumer. The second term gives the income
from myopic consumers who purchase both the base good as well as the add-on.
From each of those consumers firm i receives (pi+ p).
If instead firm i decides to unshroud the add-on, it optimally sets an add-on price
of pˆi = e so that sophisticated consumers also buy the add-on. For any price above
e sophisticated consumers would prefer the outside option at cost e. Firm i’s profits
are then
Πu = [1−αµ(1)]D(−pi− e+ p∗+ e)[pi+ e] (6)
+ αµ(1)D(−pi+ p∗)[pi+ e]
= D(−pi+ p∗)[pi+ e].
With unshrouding, both myopic and sophisticated consumers buy the add-on from
firm i. Hence, firm i earns (pi + e) per consumer. As a consequence, the profits with
unshrouding are independent of the shares of myopic and sophisticated consumers.
Comparing (5) and (6) reveals that shrouding leads to higher profits if Πs ≥Πu⇔α≥
e
p
=α. Hence, if α≥α no firm has an incentive to deviate from shrouding the add-on
and a symmetric equilibrium wherein all firms shroud exists.
Finally, let us derive the base-good price in a shrouding equilibrium. The first-order
condition with respect to the base-good price pi is given by (pi +αp¯)D′(−pi + p∗)+
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D(−pi + p∗) = 0. Solving for the symmetric equilibrium price yields p∗ = D(0)D′(0) −αp.
Firms earn profits of D(0)2/D′(0).
ii) Next, suppose that α≤ α. We show that in this case an equilibrium exists where
all firms unshroud.
Suppose that all firms except firm i unshroud the add-on and set an add-on price
pˆ∗ = e. If firm i also decides to unshroud the add-on, it optimally sets an add-on
price of pˆi = e. Firm i’s profits are then
Πu = [1−αµ(n)]D(−pi− e+ p∗+ e)[pi+ e] (7)
+ αµ(n)D(−pi+ p∗)[pi+ e]
= D(−pi+ p∗)[pi+ e].
The first term are the profits from selling the base good and the add-on to sophisti-
cated consumers and the second term from selling to the myopic consumers. Again,
with unshrouding, overall profits are independent from the share of myopic and so-
phisticated consumers.
If instead firm i decides to shroud, it optimally sets an add-on price pˆi = p to take
full advantage of myopic consumers. This leads to profits of
Πs = [1−αµ(n−1)]D(−pi− e+ p∗+ e)[pi] (8)
+ αµ(n−1)D(−pi+ p∗)[pi+ p]
= D(−pi+ p∗)[pi+ pαµ(n−1)].
Note that with n−1 firms unshrouding and 1 firm shrouding, the number of myopic
consumers is αµ(n−1) and the share of sophisticated consumers is then 1−αµ(n−1).
The first term of (8) is the income from selling to sophisticated consumers who only
buy the base good. The second term of (8) is the income from myopic consumers
buying both the base good and the add-on. Note that the profits from shrouding
decrease when there is a larger number of unshrouding firms in the market. This
is because the number of myopic consumers who would buy the expensive add-on
becomes smaller with more firms unshrouding, that is, αµ(n−1) is decreasing in n
and the incentive to deviate by shrouding become smaller.
Comparing (7) and (8) reveals that unshrouding leads to higher profits if α ≤ α =
α. Hence, if α ≤ α no firm has an incentive to deviate from unshrouding add-on
information and a symmetric equilibrium wherein all firms unshroud exists.
The equilibrium base-good price with all firms unshrouding can be derived by in-
specting the first-order condition (pi+ e)D′(−pi+ p∗)+D(−pi+ p∗)= 0. The symmet-
ric equilibrium price is then p∗ = D(0)
D′(0) − e and profits amount to D(0)2/D′(0).
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iii) Next, note that α < α because 0 < µ(n−1) < 1 . Hence, we can distinguish three
equilibrium regions:
• α>α: There is a unique symmetric equilibrium where all firms shroud add-on
information.
• α ≥ α ≥ α: Both, a symmetric shrouding and an unshrouding equilibrium ex-
ists.
• α < α: There is a unique symmetric equilibrium where all firms unshroud
add-on information.
iv) Note that asymmetric equilibria where some firms shroud and some firms un-
shroud cannot exist. We demonstrate this by contradiction. Suppose there is an
equilibrium where 0 < k < n firms unshroud and n− k > 0 firms shroud. An un-
shrouding firm does not deviate to shrouding if D(−pi+p∗)[pi+e]≥D(−pi+p∗)[pi+
αµ(k−1)p¯]⇔ e≥αµ(k−1)p¯ and a shrouding firm does not deviate if D(−pi+p∗)[pi+
αµ(k)p¯]≥D(−pi+ p∗)[pi+ e]⇔αµ(k)p¯≥ e. Together, µ(k−1)≤ eαp¯ ≤µ(k). As
∂µ
∂k
< 0,
this condition cannot be satisfied, hence a contradiction, and an asymmetric equilib-
rium does not exist.
Derivation of Proposition 3
i) The risk dominant equilibrium can be found by applying the tracing procedure by
Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
Suppose that a player assigns a probability q to the event that all remaining players
choose to shroud while the probability 1−q is assigned to the event that all remaining
players choose to unshroud.
Let q= e−αpµ(n−1)
αp[1−µ(n−1)] be the marginal belief such that a player with belief q is indiffer-
ent between shrouding and unshrouding. Hence, given a players belief q, the best
response is to shroud if q> q and to unshroud if q< q. Note that ∂q
∂α
< 0 and ∂q
∂n
> 0.
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) assume that prior beliefs q are uniformly distributed
on [0,1]. Thus, a given firm chooses to shroud with probability (1− q) and to un-
shroud with probability q. Given these priors, the expected benefit from shrouding
is αpE[µ(q¯(n− 1)− 1)] and the expected benefit from unshrouding is e. Compari-
son reveals that unshrouding is the risk dominant equilibrium if H = αpE[µ(q¯(n−
1)−1)]− e < 0. As ∂H
∂α
> 0, there exists a critical α∗ such that shrouding is the risk
dominant equilibrium if α>α∗ and unshrouding is the risk dominant equilibrium if
α<α∗.
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Finally, by the implicit function theorem, it can be shown that
dα∗
dn
=−
∂H
∂n
∂H
∂α
> 0. (9)
Hence, it follows that the range of α where unshrouding is the risk dominant equi-
librium increases if n becomes larger.
ii) Kim (1996, p. 216) shows that an equilibrium H is selected by the global games
approach if
n∑
k=1
1
n
[piHk −piLk ]> 0, (10)
where pi
j
k
denotes the payoff for a player choosing strategy H if the total number of
players choosing that strategy is k. Applied to our game shrouding is the selected
equilibrium strategy if
n∑
k=1
1
n
[ p¯αµ(n−k)− e]> 0, (11)
which can be re-expressed as
α> ne
p¯
∑n
k=1µ(n−k)
= α˜(n). (12)
Hence, if α < α˜(n) unshrouding is the selected equilibrium. As α˜(n+ 1) > α˜(n), it
follows that the parameter space where unshrouding is the selected equilibrium in-
creases with n.
Derivation of Proposition 4
Suppose that all firms unshroud the add-on and set an add-on price pˆ∗ = e. Then,
the equilibrium base-good price is equal to p∗ = t
n
−e and all firms would earn profits
of Π = t
n2
− c which corresponds to the standard Salop profit less the fixed costs of
unshrouding. We will show that is an equilibrium under the conditions provided in
Proposition 4.
First, all firms unshrouding can only be an equilibrium if profits are nonnegative,
that is, t
n2
− c ≥ 0. Solving for c gives condition ii) in Proposition 4. Second, no firm
may deviate to shrouding and increase its profits. Let αˆ= ne+2
p
t(t−cn2)−2t
np¯µ(n−1) and sup-
pose firm i deviates. Then, this firm would sell the add-on only to myopic consumers
and earn ( 1
n
+ p∗−pi
t
)(pi+αµ(n−1)s¯). The optimal base-good price in case of shroud-
ing would be p= t
n
1
2
(e+αµ(n−1)s¯) leading to profits of (2tαµ(n−1)s¯−en)
2
4tn2
. Firm i has no
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incentive to deviate if
(2tαµ(n−1)s¯−en)2
4tn2
≤ t
n2
− c which is satisfied if α ≤ αˆ. This gives
condition i) in Proposition 4.
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